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So Far bBut No Further? Transparency and Disclosure 
in the Aarhus Convention 
Michael Mason 
Insofar as the transparency turn in global environmental politics includes 
multilateral agreements, one treaty stands out as seminal—the Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters (henceforth Aarhus Convention 1998).
1
 The 
Aarhus Convention, negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), features contains a striking 
invocation of human environmental rights. Its article 1 affirms the “right of 
every person of present and future generations to live in an environment 
adequate to his or her health or well-being” as justification for its recognition, 
in environmental matters, of rights to information access, public participation, 
and access to justice. 
These Aarhus procedural rights bring corresponding duties on to states. 
Thus, for citizens’ access to information, there are information disclosure 
obligations on for public authorities. Similarly, for citizen rights to access to 
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decision- making and justice in environmental matters, the convention sets out 
associated duties. The effective realization of these procedural rights becomes 
a condition for realizing the substantive right to an adequate level of 
environmental quality. This claim about the necessary conjoining of 
procedural and substantive environmental rights is also found in the preamble 
to the Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (Kiev Protocol 
2003), adopted at a meeting of the parties to the Aarhus Convention.
2
 In force 
since October 2009, the Kiev Protocol is the first legally binding international 
instrument facilitating access to pollution registers. 
UNECE has lauded “Aarhus environmental rights” for increasing 
citizen access to environmental information across Europe, and helping to 
secure more transparent and accountable regulatory processes. As will be 
shown, the agreement has indeed introduced innovative mechanisms for 
empowering public participation in national and international decision- 
making, and affording legal standing to affected publics and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). This in part reflects the efforts of environmental NGOs 
in lobbying UNECE regarding decision-making entitlements for civil society 
actors—lobbying that found fertile ground in the 1990s in the context of 
external democracy promotion within Eastern Europe. Transparency, 
expressed as information disclosure, was seen as a necessary expression of, 
and condition for, democratic governance. In this chapter, which revises and 
updates an earlier article on the Aarhus Convention (Mason 2010), I examine 
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the nature and scope of its information disclosure obligations. Combining 
elements of constructivism and critical political economy, the theoretical 
concern is with the historical emergence, institutionalization, and effects of the 
information disclosure norms prescribed by the convention. 
The close association of Aarhus transparency with democracy 
promotion suggests confirmation of the first hypothesis set out chapter 1—that 
the extensive adoption of transparency in global environmental governance is 
largely driven by democratization and marketization trends, although this 
finding does not capture the relationship between the two drivers in this case. 
In the next section, I argue that the marketization driver was has been more 
significant in shaping Aarhus information disclosure, because the UNECE’s 
promotion of political modernization in central Central and eastern Eastern 
Europe has deferred in practice to market liberal norms of governance dictated 
by multilateral economic actors. 
After setting out this historical context for the adoption of the Aarhus 
Convention, I then survey the institutionalization of its information rights. 
Drawing on materials from the treaty secretariat and parties to the convention, 
as well as relevant nonstate actors (notably public communications to the 
Aarhus Convention compliance committee), I examine the second hypothesis, 
presented in chapter 1, that the institutionalization of transparency decenters or 
qualifies state-led regulation and also opens up political space for new actors. 
For the Aarhus Convention, these tendencies relate, firstly, to the extent to 
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which state sovereign actors implement and comply with treaty obligations 
and, secondly, to the governance scope for civil society actors in realizing and 
validating information disclosure. An analysis of the implementation record of 
the parties to the convention reveals a mixed picture of compliance with 
information disclosure obligations, with civil society actors playing a major 
role in scrutinizing and challenging states over their implementation practice. 
Finally, I investigate the normative, procedural, and substantive effects 
of Aarhus governance by disclosure. The third hypothesis examined in this 
book is that transparency is more likely to be effective under contexts resonant 
with the goals and decision processes of both disclosers and recipients. The 
Aarhus Convention advances disclosure obligations that are general enough to 
fit divergent political systems and administrative cultures, while and at the 
same time holding holds enough legal specificity to steer behavior. I identify 
major normative, procedural, and substantive effects arising from the 
application of these obligations: I argue that they reflect a structural imbalance 
in the articulation of Aarhus rights between social welfare and market liberal 
perspectives,; and that the dominance of the latter has eroded the efficacy of 
the convention’s information disclosure obligations. This seems to corroborate 
the “loss of innocence” thesis posited by Mol in chapter 2, though given that 
market liberal ideas framed the convention from its inception, Aarhus 
transparency was never innocent. 
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Embracing Transparency 
The genealogy of the Aarhus Convention is closely bound up with the 
widening diplomatic work of UNECE over several decades. While Although 
ostensibly a forum for pan-European economic integration, UNECE has 
developed a body of international environmental law covering transboundary 
aspects of air pollution, environmental impact assessment, industrial accidents, 
and the protection and use of shared watercourses. During the East–-West 
détente process of the mid- to late 1970s, it was the selection of transboundary 
air pollution as a negotiation issue for mutual gain that favored UNECE as an 
institutional setting for environmental rule- making (Wettestad 2000, 95). 
Following the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe, the UNECE co-
initiated an ‘“Environment for Europe’ Europe” initiative in 1991 to promote 
pan-European environmental cooperation. Environment for Europe 
discussions served as the immediate backdrop for the two years of 
negotiations that produced the Aarhus Convention, and it was at the fourth 
ministerial conference (in Aarhus, Denmark, in June 1998) under this process 
that the convention was adopted. 
According to UNECE, the Aarhus Convention was based in part on its 
experience of implementing previous environmental agreements, including the 
application of information -disclosure provisions (Economic Commission for 
Europe 2000, 25). In an effort to codify these various entitlements, in 1995 
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UNECE produced Guidelines on Access to Environmental Information and 
Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making. The geopolitical 
context of regime change and independence in former Warsaw Pact countries 
gave an unprecedented opportunity for the commission to set a regional 
governance agenda that, in the creation of new legal instruments, fused 
democratic entitlements with environmental protection norms. Between 1990 
and 1995, 16 sixteen newly independent Ccentral and Eeastern European 
states joined UNECE and, at least symbolically, were keen to embrace 
democratic values. In October 1995, at the third ministerial conference under 
the Environment for Europe umbrella, the participating environment ministers 
endorsed the UNECE Guidelines guidelines and, in the Sofia Ministerial 
Declaration, called for all countries in the region to ensure that they had an 
effective legal framework to secure public access to environmental 
information and public participation in environmental decision- making. 
Thus, the pan-European development of environmental information 
disclosure by UNECE cannot be divorced from its democracy promotion 
efforts in central Central and eastern Eastern Europe. Indeed, Secretary-
General Kofi Annan labeled the Aarhus Convention the most ambitious 
venture in “environmental democracy” undertaken by the United Nations 
(Economic Commission for Europe 2000, v). From 1989 onwards, both the 
European Commission and the United States funded major governmental and 
nongovernmental capacity-building programs in the former communist 
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countries, which included the creation in Budapest of a Regional 
Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe. In this context of 
external democracy promotion, the development of the Aarhus Convention 
was notable for the active role of transition countries in shaping its provisions, 
given that these states were already adopting new environmental information 
and participation laws with an explicit human rights component (Jancar-
Webster 1998; Stec 2005). It is not surprising, therefore, that article 1 of the 
convention champions a substantive environmental right—the equal 
entitlement of all persons, across generations, to a decent level of 
environmental quality. This represents a strong conception of social welfare, 
which is compatible, in principle, with socialist and social democratic norms 
from a range of European political traditions. It implies regulatory constraints 
on private investment and trade decisions generating significant environmental 
harm. 
However, the substantive commitment to environmental justice in 
article 1 was soon at odds with the aggressive free -market restructuring 
facilitated for the new democracies by multilateral development banks (e.g., 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and private investment 
actors. The UNECE mandate for facilitating European economic 
development—interpreted in the preamble to the Aarhus Convention as 
“sustainable development”—deferred in practice to this market- liberal model 
of economic development. Thus, the commission’s commitment to 
Formatted: Font: Italic
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information disclosure as supportive of its core commitment to Eeast–-Wwest 
cooperation mirrored Western economic liberalization and privatization 
objectives for transition countries, which were set as conditionalities for 
European Union and World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. Within 
this dominant norm complex of neoliberalism, information disclosure by 
governmental and private actors is market correcting rather than market 
forcing: it is seen as reducing the incidence of environmental externalities by 
rectifying information deficits and asymmetries. In other words, it is 
appropriate for states to facilitate information disclosure as a public good to 
promote market efficiencies, but in the service of, rather than as a challenge to, 
profit-motivated imperatives for economic growth (Tietenberg 1998; Dasgupta 
et al. 2001). 
It is necessary to recognize, therefore, the historicity of the governance 
by disclosure formulated by UNECE for the Aarhus Convention. While 
Although democratization served as the main driver for the multilateral 
embrace of environmental information disclosure, there were ideological 
divisions over the aims and scope of this disclosure from the outset. In the first 
place, UNECE embraced the transformative potential of governance by 
disclosure as part of a new social contract between the citizens of the new 
democracies and their first elected governments. As detailed belowin the 
following, this is evident in the development of convention obligations that 
embodied far-reaching public entitlements to information access. The causal 
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assumption that information can empower members of the public is explicitly 
made in the ninth and tenth preambular paragraphs of the convention, where 
improved access to information—conjoined with public participation—is 
claimed to enhance public awareness and understanding, the communication 
to decision- makers of matters of public concerns, and greater accountability 
of public authorities. Many parties to the convention, in their implementation 
reports, support the view that information disclosure is enabling for their 
citizens (Economic Commission for Europe 2008b2008c, 21–22). 
Secondly, and at variance with the convention commitment to public 
empowerment, is the deference to market liberal norms that exempt private 
entities from democratic accountability. In keeping with market liberal notions 
of regulation, the Aarhus Convention restricts its direct obligations to public 
authorities. While Although “public authority” is understood in an expansive 
sense as all governmental authorities and natural or legal persons with public 
administrative functions and other environmental responsibilities, functions, 
and public service providers (article 2), this definition clearly circumscribes its 
class of duty holders. Privately owned entities only fall within the immediate 
scope of the convention only insofar as they perform public functions deemed 
to be environment-related, such as the provision of energy or water services. 
The discretion allowed here has invited inconsistencies among parties. 
The UK Governmentgovernment, for example, has exempted private water 
and sewage companies from Aarhus obligations by applying a restrictive 
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definition, while whereas Ireland has defined public authorities more broadly 
(Economic Commission for Europe 2011b, 11–12; Ryall 2011, 58–59). 
Significantly, when UNECE considers the role of the private sector in the 
Implementation implementation Guide guide to the Aarhus Convention, it is in 
relation to non-mandatory notions of “corporate citizenship” and stakeholder 
engagement. Business and industry is one of the “major groups” identified by 
the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 at the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (Economic Commission for Europe 2000, 19–
20). The claim that direct environmental information disclosure for private 
operators can effectively be tackled by voluntary means (e.g., eco-labeling and 
eco-auditing schemes) is stated explicitly in article 5(6) of the 
Conventionconvention, which relates to the public dissemination of 
information held by private entities. 
To summarize, the uptake of Aarhus information disclosure confirms 
the first hypothesis presented in chapter 1—that the adoption of transparency 
in global environmental governance is largely driven by democratization and 
marketization trends—although this finding, by itself, does not capture the 
dynamic tension between the two drivers. While Although political 
modernization was particularly important to the uptake of the convention, 
especially in the new European democracies, its information disclosure 
provisions were significantly inflected, and compromised, by market liberal 
norms of governance. The restrictive influence of the marketization driver 
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becomes more evident as we turn now to the institutionalization of Aarhus 
information disclosure. 
Institutionalizing Transparency 
The Access -to- Information Pillar 
The Aarhus Convention articulates a rights-based framework of governance 
by disclosure, focusing on the procedural rights of citizens, with access to 
information supportive of access to decision- making and access to justice in 
environmental matters. As the first pillar, access to information thus becomes 
an indispensable prerequisite for the other environmental rights in the 
convention (Hayward 2005, 178). Aarhus information disclosure combines 
obligations on convention parties with novel public entitlements. To what 
extent, then, does it confirm the hypothesis posited in chapter 1 that the 
institutionalization of transparency decenters state-led regulation and opens 
up governance space for new actors? 
In the context of an international treaty, the first part of this hypothesis 
denotes how shared decision-making rules qualify sovereign state authority. 
Articles 4 and 5 of the convention cover, respectively, the means by which 
environmental information is requested from public authorities and the 
obligations on parties to ensure that such authorities actively disseminate 
environmental information from a variety of sources. Both articles include the 
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provision that obligations are enacted “within the framework of national 
legislation,” which allows parties significant discretion in disclosing 
information, including conditions for refusing information requests (e.g., for 
reasons of national defense and security, commercial confidentiality, and 
personal data protection). However, parties are obliged to interpret grounds for 
refusal in a restrictive way “taking into account the public interest served by 
disclosure and taking into account whether the information requested relates to 
emissions into the environment” (article 4(2)). In contrast to the passive 
(request-based) disclosure obligations on public authorities contained in article 
4, article 5 covers the forms and categories of environmental information that 
public authorities are actively required to collect and disseminate. The priority 
accorded to public access to such information places the onus on these 
authorities to order and publish relevant environmental information, including 
national state-of-the-environment reports, legislation and policy documents, 
environment-related policy information, and information on pollution releases 
and transfers. 
Furthermore, article 5 provided a legal basis for the Aarhus parties to 
develop the Kiev Protocol, with the goal of enhancing public access to 
information through the establishment of coherent, integrated, nationwide 
pollutant release and transfer registers. Parties are obliged to ensure effective 
public access to the information contained in national registers, which follow a 
harmonized reporting scheme that is mandatory, annual, multimedia, facility-
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specific, and pollutant- or waste-specific. In an important distinction, the Kiev 
Protocol is open to all states, so its governance by disclosure ambit transcends 
membership of UNECE. The other new legal instrument proposed to parties of 
the convention is an amendment adopted at the second meeting of the parties 
in Almaty, Kazakhstan, May 2005. The amendment, which is not yet in force, 
adds a provision to the convention (article 6 bis) requiring each party to 
“provide for early and effective information and public participation prior to 
making decisions on whether to permit the deliberate release into the 
environment and placing on the market of genetically modified organisms.” 
This clause is designed to render more precise a reference to genetically 
modified organisms in article 6(11) of the convention, which was deliberately 
left vague in recognition of the political conflicts underway at the time in 
negotiating what became the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (see also Gupta, this volumebook, chapter 
6). 
The comprehensive scope of Aarhus transparency rights and 
obligations represents a major international commitment to governance by 
disclosure, and thus the willingness of convention parties to forego at least 
some freedom of unilateral movement in this realm. In principle, extensive 
areas of public decision- making are covered by the access- to- information 
pillar, although the following discussion below onf implementation practices 
 
 
158 
suggests the resistance of at least some parties to a generous interpretation of 
the Aarhus obligations on information disclosure. 
The second facet of institutionalization of Aarhus transparency—new 
governance entitlements for civil society actors—owes, in the first instance, a 
semantic debt to another UNECE agreement, the 1991 Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo 
Convention, 1991). From this agreement, theThe Aarhus Convention imports 
the broad notion of the public as “one or more natural or legal persons” from 
this agreement, and adds to this adding, for emphasis, associations, 
organizations, or groups in accordance with national legislation or practice.
3
 
The Aarhus ConventionIt also has a separate formulation of “the public 
concerned,” encompassing those persons likely to be affected by, or having an 
interest in, relevant environmental decision- making, including environmental 
NGOs (article 2(5)). These expansive notions of the public are politically 
significant, because Aarhus entitlements address persons regardless of 
nationality, residence, or citizenship (article 3(9)). At least in principle, then, 
information disclosure (and other Aarhus) obligations on public authorities are 
extensive and without discrimination. 
Public entitlements under the Aarhus Convention also extend to its 
compliance mechanism, representing a major innovation in judicial oversight 
(Krämer 2012, 98). Article 15 of the convention expressly allows “appropriate 
public involvement,” which may include “the option of consideration of 
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communications from members of the public related to this Convention.” 
These entitlements were further elaborated and adopted at tThe first meeting 
of the parties to the Aarhus Convention in October 2002 in Lucca, Italy further 
elaborated and adopted these entitlements. They now include the right of 
members of the public to nominate candidates to the compliance committee, as 
well as the right to submit to this body allegations of non-compliance by any 
party  and thereafter should be entitled to participate in the discussions of the 
committee (Economic Commission for Europe, 2004a). At the Lucca meeting, 
the United States (attending as a UNECE member state but not an Aarhus 
Convention signatory) criticized the novel scope of these public oversight 
rights as contrary to established multilateral treaty practice. Nevertheless, they 
are extensively utilized used (as noted belowin the following). Similar public 
oversight rights are also included in the compliance committee mechanism 
established in April 2010 under the Kiev Protocol. I now turn to the 
implementation record on Aarhus information disclosure to gauge the role in 
practice of state commitment and compliance challenges from civil society 
actors. 
Implementation and Compliance Experience 
The Aarhus Convention entered into force on 30 October 30, 2001. As of 
AprilSeptember 20132, there were 46 forty-six parties to the convention, 30 
thirty-two parties to the Kiev Protocol, and 27 twenty-seven parties to the 
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amendment on genetically modified organisms. Decision I/8, adopted at the 
first meeting conference of the parties, requires parties to the convention to 
report on their implementation activities before the relevant meeting of the 
parties. Three reporting cycles had been completed by the fourth meeting of 
the parties in Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, 29 June 29–-1 July 1, 2011. For 
each reporting cycle, the Aarhus Convention secretariat is charged with 
producing a synthesis report on implementation, but is limited by its mandate 
and resource constraints in verifying the content of the reports—a common 
problem associated with the reliance on self-reporting in the implementation 
of multilateral environmental agreements (Treves et al. 2009). 
In generating these reports, the Aarhus Convention secretariat has 
categorized countries into three regional groupings on the basis of 
implementation capacity. Firstly, the parties from Eastern Europe, the 
Caucasus, and Central Asia (EECCA) face common implementation issues 
because of their shared experience as post-Soviet states transitioning to 
democratic governance. These parties are credited by the secretariat with 
having made the most progress with the access -to -information pillar in the 
convention, in part enabled by significant capacity- building for 
implementation financed since 1999 by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe. The organization has supported the creation of Aarhus 
Centers and Public Environmental Information Centers—for awareness- 
raising, training, and communications activities—in Albania, Armenia, 
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Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe 2008). 
In the second regional grouping—the European Union (EU) countries 
and Norway—implementation of information- access provisions is more 
advanced, given prevailing legislation and mature democratic systems. 
Furthermore, European Community ratification of the Aarhus Convention 
means that it is binding on Community community authorities and on member 
states, harmonizing the implementation of the convention across the European 
Union. Thus, Regulation (EC) No. 1367/2006 applying the Aarhus Convention 
to cCommunity institutions and bodies was adopted in September 2006. The 
European Commission subsequently published directives designed to align 
Community community legislation with each of the three Aarhus pillars, with 
Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information adopted in 
January 2003, repealing a 1990 directive on environmental information access 
(Commission of the European Communities 2008: , 4).
4
 
The third regional grouping—South-Eastern Europe (SEE)—covers 
three parties (Albania, Bulgaria, and The the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia) deemed by the Aarhus Convention secretariat to share 
implementation challenges arising from their experience of regional insecurity 
in the western Balkans and their participation in Stabilization and Association 
Agreements with the European Union. Indeed, the European Commission 
sponsors a Regional Environmental Reconstruction Programme for South 
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Eastern Europe, which supports capacity-building for Aarhus Convention 
implementation (Regional Environmental Reconstruction Programme for 
South Eastern Europe 2007). 
The synthesis reports on implementation produced by the convention 
secretariat have noted that parties appear to have fewest problems in 
implementing information disclosure obligations compared to the other two 
pillars of the convention. For the provisions on access to information  upon 
request (article 4), all submitted national implementation reports show relevant 
legislation in place. However, for EECCA and SEE Partiesparties, the 
secretariat has identified recurring implementation obstacles. These include 
legislative gaps and discrepancies compared to convention clauses, 
ambiguities over the meaning of “environmental information,” and lack of 
explanation from public authorities when refusing information requests. 
Different legal approaches to implementing article 4 are also found in EU 
countries and Norway, but within a more established culture of openness. The 
most significant variation—and one that goes beyond Aarhus right -to -
information provisions—is the right of the public in Norway to access 
information directly from private enterprises, rather than only from public 
authorities (Economic Commission for Europe 2008b2008c, 10–11; 2011b, 
16). 
The reported experience of parties in implementing the Aarhus 
obligations on the collection and dissemination of environmental information 
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(article 5) attests to extensive legal development, though many EECCA and 
SEE parties point to procedural uncertainties and resource constraints as 
negatively affecting active information disclosure. In By contrast, most EU 
countries and Norway have reported no major obstacles to the implementation 
of Aarhus provisions on information collection and dissemination. Indeed, the 
convention secretariat applauded progress by these parties in developing 
electronic tools for information disclosure and in setting up pollutant release 
and transfer registers consistent with their ratification of the Kiev Protocol 
(Economic Commission for Europe 2008b2008c, 11–13; and 2011b, 15–17). 
Nevertheless, public communications to the Aarhus Convention 
Compliance Committee reveal a more mixed picture—at least in terms of 
alleged breaches of information disclosure obligations of the convention. By 
the end of 2011, the compliance committee had only received only one 
submission from a party to the convention with regard to compliance by 
another party, but had received 63 sixty-three communications on compliance 
from the public.
5
 Over half of the public submissions concern issues of public 
participation, which has led the compliance committee to register concerns 
about the implementation of the second pillar of the convention. As Table 
table 4.1 indicates, in the period 2004–2011, there were 21 twenty-one public 
communications alleging non-compliance of parties with the information- 
disclosure provisions of the Aarhus Convention. 
[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
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Table 4.1 shows that public communications to the compliance 
committee about information disclosure have focused on article 4—the 
convention provision on access to information. Interestingly, of the twelve 
cases in which the committee had adopted findings by the end of 2012, ten 
were rulings of non-compliance. All but two of these cases of non-compliance 
featured article 4(1)—requiring public authorities to respond effectively to 
requests for information. Most non-complaint countries were from the EECA 
regional grouping: under the convention’s soft compliance regime, these 
countries have been granted extensions and assistance in bringing relevant 
legislation or practices into compliance: only Ukraine, taking seven years to 
realign information access provision, induced the compliance committee to 
raise the prospect of a diplomatic caution from convention parties. Spain has 
twice been ruled to be non-compliant with convention obligations on access to 
environmental information, highlighting deficiencies in its domestic 
transposition of the convention. Compliance discussions at the fifth meeting of 
the parties in 2011 did not identify any serious shortcomings in the 
implementation of the information- access pillar of the convention. The parties 
decided, nonetheless, to create a task force that was charged, among other 
duties, with identifying capacity-building needs, barriers, and solutions with 
respect to public access to environmental information (Economic Commission 
for Europe 2011a, 5–7). 
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The implementation practice of the Aarhus Convention offers partial 
support to the second hypothesis, presented in chapter 1, that the 
institutionalization of transparency decenters state-led regulation and opens up 
political space for new actors. There is no clear confirmation of the first part 
of the hypothesis, because the constraints on sovereign authority posed by 
Aarhus rules on transparency are significantly offset by the discretionary space 
afforded to parties in interpreting these rules. There are firmer grounds to 
accept the second part of the hypothesis, asbecause, under the convention, 
civil society actors have held states answerable for their compliance with 
Aarhus obligations, including those pertaining to information disclosure. 
Effects of Transparency 
Drawing on transparency scholarship, the first two chapters of this book put 
forward the hypothesis that transparency is more likely to be effective under 
contexts resonant with the goals and decision processes of both disclosures 
and recipients. A directional version of this hypothesis—posited in chapter 1 
and addressing the dominance of market liberal ideas in global environmental 
governance—is that the adoption of transparency in liberal environmental 
contexts will have minimal market-restricting effects. This is not to suggest an 
absence of “positive” transparency outcomes, but rather that transparency 
effects will tend to reinforce understandings of public and private authority 
consistent with market liberalism. In line with the categorization of effects 
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informing contributions to thiselaborated in chapter 1 of this volumebook, I 
distinguish between next among key normative, procedural, and substantive 
effects of Aarhus governance by disclosure. 
The Normative Selectivity of Aarhus Rights 
As noted above, the Aarhus Convention articulates a rights-based approach to 
governance by disclosure forged in the crucible of democracy promotion for 
Central and Eastern Europe. Notwithstanding its embrace of “environmental 
democracy,” this worldview of political modernization was largely framed by 
Western European and US models of market liberalism. As evident in Aarhus 
implementation practice, the normative selectivity of this governance project 
is most telling regarding the exclusion of private actors from mandatory 
information disclosure duties. 
To recall, Aarhus obligations fall directly on convention parties and 
constituent public authorities, with privately owned entities having Aarhus 
responsibilities only insofar as they perform public functions deemed to be 
environment-related. Convention provisions on information disclosure 
addressing the environmental impact of private operators (article 5(6)) and 
products (article 5(8)) are framed in a non-mandatory, aspirational fashion. To 
be sure, the obligation on parties to establish pollutant release and transfer 
registers (article 5(9)), as developed in the Kiev Protocol, is regarded as an 
important convention mechanism for increasing corporate accountability 
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(Economic Commission for Europe 2004b, 4). While Although the protocol 
has entered into force, there are few signs within convention practice of a 
“hardening” of information disclosure duties on private entities. For example, 
the United Kingdom has resisted claims by NGOs that privatized water 
companies have “public authority” functions subject to Aarhus Convention 
duties. In its reviews of implementation practice, the Aarhus Convention 
secretariat has noted an extensive preference among parties for voluntary eco-
labeling and environmental auditing by the private sector, with mandatory 
disclosure of product information generally limited to specific sectors; , e.g.for 
example, European energy efficiency requirements for household appliances 
and vehicles (Economic Commission for Europe 2008b2008c, 13; 2011b, 15–
16). Moreover, at the third of the parties, during negotiations on the 2009–
2014 strategic plan for the convention, the European Union vetoed a proposal 
by Norway to grant public actors the right to access information directly from 
industry. This proposal had been inspired by community- right-to-know 
entitlements enshrined in the Norwegian constitution and Environmental 
Information Act 2003 (Economic Commission for Europe 2008a2008b, 19; 
and European ECO Forum 2008). 
Excluding private enterprises from mandatory information disclosure 
duties is of course consistent with a market liberal model of corporate social 
responsibility in which information disclosure depends on the voluntary 
consent of the operator (Gunningham 2007; and Garsten and Lindh de 
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Montoya 2008). Pollution release and transfer registers create indirect 
obligations on operators. While Although typically structured, as under the 
Kiev Protocol, to promote free, user-friendly access to standardized pollution- 
and facility-specific information, they defer to commercial control over the 
generation of raw data. The right to confidentiality of commercial information 
is a justifiable basis under the Aarhus Convention for public authorities to 
refuse requests for environmental information (article 4(4)(d)). This 
exemption is tempered in principle by a public interest in information 
disclosure, but this has not been borne out by implementation practice. Of 
particular relevance here is the tendency of EU institutions to shield corporate 
actors from Aarhus responsibilities. For example, the European ombudsman 
censured the European Commission in March 2010 for citing commercial 
confidentiality as a reason to block NGO access to copies of communications 
with a German carmaker over proposed reductions in vehicle emissions 
(European Ombudsman 2010). Similarly, the European Union has diluted a 
public entitlement, under the access -to -justice pillar of the convention (article 
9(3)), to allow access to legal mechanisms for facilitating the direct liability of 
private parties and public authorities for non-compliance with environmental 
law (including information disclosure). In Regulation (EC) No. 1367/2006, 
applying the convention to Community community institutions and bodies, the 
European Union omits the reference to private parties in its legal codification 
of this article, thereby blunting its regulatory potential (Ryland 2008, 530–
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531). This reinforces a market liberal perspective on regulatory authority, one 
in which private operators are shielded from administrative and judicial 
challenges issuing from civil society actors. 
Procedural Flexibility: National Discretion and 
Implementation Gaps 
In several provisions of the Aarhus Convention—including the specification 
of obligations for by parties for each of the three pillars—there are references 
to prescribed action “within the framework of/in accordance with national 
legislation.” The convention secretariat has interpreted this to mean that 
parties are allowed “flexibility” in deciding how to implement selected Aarhus 
obligations.
6
 This discretionary space seems sensible in view of the varying 
legal systems and governance capacities of parties across the UNECE region. 
Nonetheless, early commentators on the convention already anticipated 
difficulties arising from the ambiguity of these phrases, including for the 
access -to -information pillar (Lee and Abbot 2003, 93). Implementation 
experience indicates that the discretion allowed to parties regarding Aarhus 
information provisions has been most problematic for EECCA parties, some 
of whom have struggled to accommodate the right to information within 
administrative cultures with an institutional memory of secret and closed 
decision- making. As Stec notes, “access to information, the right to 
disseminate information, and the control of information are still contentious 
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issues in many countries with a common legacy of strict information control” 
(2005, 14). Of course, part of the administrative challenge facing public 
authorities in EECCA (and SEE) countries is to respect the political legitimacy 
of civil society actors as Aarhus rights -holders. For EECCA parties facing 
public charges of non-compliance under the convention, most submissions to 
the convention compliance committee were made by domestic NGOs. 
Even for Wwestern European democracies and the European Union, 
however, it has been claimed that the interpretive discretion allowed to parties 
by the convention has diluted the force of its obligations. The compliance 
committee has criticized the excessive time taken by some parties to meet 
public requests for environmental information; , for example, declaring the 
seven years that Danish authorities took over one information request as “not 
compatible with the Convention” (Economic Commission for Europe 2012, 
1). There are particular concerns that rights to information and participation 
are sometimes treated more narrowly in implementing legislation than in the 
letter or spirit of the convention. For example, EU Directive 2003/35/EC—
transposing Aarhus public participation provisions to EU Member member 
Statesstates—restricts the right to participate in environmental decision- 
making to those affected by or with an interest in the decision, rather than to 
any member of the public (Verschuuren 2005, 38–39). This has implications 
for information access, as because the public participation provisions of the 
convention have corresponding information- disclosure entitlements. Aarhus-
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enabled public rights to information and participation seem to be most at risk 
of truncation for decision- making with transboundary environmental effects. 
While Although the convention recognizes that Aarhus rights have effect 
regardless of nationality (article 3(9)), state practice has not been to grant 
decision-making rights to foreign publics. TZwier argues, for example, that 
the activities of European investment and export credit agencies expose most 
vividly the implementation gap here, as because Aarhus rights to information 
and participation extend in principle to those abroad affected by the 
environmental effects of projects financed by such agencies. Yet in practice, 
these foreign publics typically have no access to information on credit  
investment and credit decisionsagency activities affecting their lives and 
livelihoods (Economic Commission for Europe 2009, 9; Zwier 2007, 228–
229). 
Discretion to each party “within the framework of its national 
legislation” is also expressed in article 9(1) of the Aarhus Convention, 
concerning access to justice for those persons who consider that their requests 
for information under article 4 were not effectively met. Self-reporting by 
parties on their implementation of article 9(1) reveals a wide range of 
administrative and/or judicial proceedings and bodies for review of appeals 
related to requests for information (Economic Commission for Europe 
2008b2008c, 18–19; 2011b, 22–24). The routing of appeals through divergent 
legal vehicles justifies the flexibility of implementation allowed by the 
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convention, although this makes it difficult to assess the equality of treatment 
of applicants across the parties. While Although the convention compliance 
committee has only received only a few public communications regarding 
article 9(1), there have been, since 2010, a significant number of complaints 
relating to the wider range of access to justice obligations covered by article 9. 
Most of these public communications reveal a perception that the discretion 
afforded to Aarhus parties has allowed them to restrict public access to justice, 
whether through narrow interpretations of standing (Czech Republic, 
Armenia), inadequate access to review procedures over alleged contraventions 
of national environmental law (Austria, European Union), and prohibitively 
expensive procedures (Denmark, United Kingdom). There are also ongoing 
concerns about the European Commission’s adoption of an unduly restrictive 
interpretation of article 9 to limit its Aarhus obligations on access to justice in 
environmental matters (Justice and the Environment 2010; Poncelet 2012). 
Indeed, the EU General Court ruled in June 2012 that the European 
Commission was violating the Aarhus Convention in applying narrow grounds 
for public challenges to administrative acts and omissions contravening 
relevant environmental law.
7
 
The Retreat from Substantive Rights 
Implementation reports submitted by parties to the Aarhus Convention 
secretariat reveal little reflection on the effectiveness of the convention in 
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protecting or promoting substantive environmental rights. In other words, 
there has been no systematic scrutiny of a key assumption informing its 
adoption: that information disclosure by parties to the convention will lead to 
environmental improvements. The right to an adequate environment contained 
in article 1 lacks specification in treaty practice; and this indeterminacy 
reflects more than the procedural thrust of the convention, for it is surely in the 
interests of the parties to identify substantive benefits promoted by increased 
transparency, participation, and access to justice in environmental matters. 
Instead, the indeterminacy reveals, above all, the liberal rights–-based 
paradigm dominating convention design and implementation. 
In the first place, it expresses a liberal political aversion to prescribe a 
particular set of life choices by empowering a substantive environmental right. 
A declaration made by the UK Government government upon adopting the 
Aarhus Convention expresses this, treating the human right to a healthy 
environment as no more than an aspiration, and according legal recognition 
only to the procedural rights created by the convention. Even for those Aarhus 
parties that who legally recognize this substantive right, there is extensive 
uncertainty about its connection to convention’s procedural rights. In the 
structuring of their national implementation reports, parties are requested to 
follow a template provided by the convention secretariat: this includes the 
request to report on how their implementation of the Aarhus Convention 
contributes to the protection of the right to live in an environment adequate to 
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human health and well-being. Of the 37 thirty-seven implementation reports 
received by the convention secretariat in the second (2008) round of reporting, 
13 thirteen contain no response to this request, and the majority of the rest 
feature substantive right statements that are cursory and/or vague. 
Interestingly, the recurring claim in those reports that construct a more 
significant response is that Aarhus procedural rights contribute to fulfilling the 
substantive right by empowering civil society (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Slovenia, 
Ukraine), especially when that substantive right has national constitutional 
protection (Belgium, Finland, Germany, Kazakhstan). 
Secondly, the absence of substantive environmental standards in the 
convention is also a practical obstacle impinging on its commitment to human 
rights, as because it arguably reduces the scope for public deliberation on the 
appropriateness of environmental decision- making according to competing 
social values (Bell 2004, 103–104; Jones 2008). Information disclosure and 
public participation risk becoming more a means for legitimizing rather than 
interrogating governance institutions, and for benchmarking public authorities 
against procedural checklists rather than substantive environmental standards. 
Advances in information and communications technologies, which allow 
citizens to utilize use complex information in a politically transformative way, 
may however increase the scope for citizens and civil society groups to 
explore the conditions needed to realize environmental health and well-being 
for current and future generations. Article 5(3) of the Aarhus Convention 
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requires parties to ensure that environmental information progressively 
becomes available in electronic databases that are publicly accessible, and 
most parties are now using electronic communications tools (Economic 
Commission for Europe 2008b2008c, 12). Thus, it is becoming more feasible 
for these parties to advance “targeted transparency” in which the holders of 
Aarhus rights are able to make reasoned judgments about specific policy 
choices (Fung at el. 2007, 39–46). Such moves would complement rather than 
supplant the general information disclosure provisions of the convention, but 
by themselves will not thicken its substantive effects. 
Conclusion 
Marking a decade since its entry into force, on 1 July 1, 2011, the fourth 
meeting of the parties to the Aarhus Convention adopted the Chisinau 
Declaration to reaffirm their commitment to the convention as a touchstone for 
environmental democracy, promoting public access to information, decision- 
making, and justice in environmental matters. This optimism as to the 
transformative potential of Aarhus rights resulted in a decision by the parties 
to encourage global accession to the convention (Economic Commission for 
Europe 2011a, 26–27). At least for the access -to -information pillar, the 
assumption is that transparency and disclosure are transferable norms of 
democratic governance. I have argued here, however, that the information 
rights given force by the convention articulate a selective liberal framing that 
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limits their application and transformative force. The preoccupation with 
procedural entitlements fits comfortably with existing liberal expressions of 
civil and political rights in the domestic law of western UNECE states, even as 
the bold declaration in the treaty of a universal human right to an environment 
adequate for health and well-being anticipates a more ambitious conception of 
social justice. In implementation practice, the de facto bracketing of the 
Aarhus substantive right dissipates the tension between these two perspectives. 
The historicity of Aarhus governance by disclosure is central to 
understanding the limits to transparency set by this marginalization. This is 
characterized, above all, by a geopolitical context featuring the spread of 
market liberalism and representative democracy to Eastern Europe, as well as 
the embrace of neo-liberalism by leading western Western governments. The 
key driver of Aarhus transparency was democratization, fed by popular 
demands for openness and inclusivity in decision- making on environmental 
matters, but one inflected by a deepening marketization of European 
economies. As noted above, this ideological current has affected the treatment 
in the convention of private entities, which (in contrast with public authorities) 
are shielded from direct information- disclosure duties concerning 
environmental information. Other chapters in this volume book indicate that a 
structured preference for voluntary disclosure from private actors is typical of 
new transparency regimes in global environmental governance (e.g., 
Dingwerth and Eichinger, this book, chapter 10, this volume; Van Alstine, this 
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book, chapter 1211, this volume). The reporting requirements placed by the 
Kiev Protocol on private owners and operators of polluting facilities suggests 
that it is possible under the convention to go further in promoting corporate 
accountability for environmental harm, though these remain indirect 
obligations mediated by treaty parties. 
The previousforegoing discussion above of the implementation of 
Aarhus information rights offers some support to the hypothesis that the 
institutionalization of transparency decenters state-led regulation and opens up 
political space for new actors. On the first part of the hypothesis, sovereign 
powers are indeed steered in favor of transparency by multilateral obligations, 
although the discretionary space afforded to parties in interpreting rules has 
diluted the force of Aarhus information disclosure. More confidence 
accompanies confirmation of the second part of the thesis in the sense that 
civil society actors have acquired a major governance role, over and above 
their information- access rights, in holding states to account for their 
compliance with Aarhus obligations. The Aarhus Convention has achieved 
significant gains in the transparency of public authorities. However, the review 
of its normative, procedural, and substantive effects confirms the hypothesis 
that transparency adopted in liberal environmental contexts will tend to have 
minimal market-restricting effects. A number of factors significantly 
compromise the transformative potential of Aarhus rules on information 
disclosure. These include the exclusion of private actors from mandatory 
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disclosure requirements; , the low regulatory ambition of parties (evident in 
their restrictive interpretations of Aarhus rights); ), and the symbolic treatment 
of the article 1 environmental right, suggesting that Aarhus procedural rights 
require no substantive outcomes vis-à-vis the activities of public and private 
actors. The convention has not breached centers of private authority 
responsible for major environmental harm: it could, and should, go further. 
  
Notes 
1. Aarhus Convention 1998 (adopted 25 June 25, 1998; in force 30 October 
30, 2001). 
2. Kiev Protocol 2003 (adopted 21 May 21, 2003; in force 8 October 8, 2009). 
3. Espoo Convention 1991, Artart. 1(x); Aarhus Convention 1998, Artart. 
2(4). 
4. While Although a directive (2003/35/EC) has also been adopted in relation 
to the public participation pillar of the Aarhus Convention, a proposed 
directive on access to justice (COM(2003) 624) failed to get sufficient support 
from member states. 
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5. See http://www.unece.org/env/pp/pubcom.htm for information on all public 
communications to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee. 
6. For the access -to -information pillar, the term phrase “within the 
framework of national legislation” appears in Articles articles 4(1) and 5(2). 
See Economic Commission for Europe (2000, 30–31). 
7. Judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 14 June 14, 2012, 
Case T-338/08., Aavailable at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-
338/08. 
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